ABSTRACT

Two experiments were conducted to explore a hypothesis that people’s trait judgments about Jewish males can be dissociated from prejudice against them. Two general findings supported this hypothesis. First, although participants made more positive, and fewer negative, trait judgments about Jewish males than about Christian males, they were relatively unwilling to have a daughter (if they had a daughter) marry a Jew. Second, participants’ positive trait judgments about Christians were correlated with their willingness to have a daughter marry one, but no correlation was obtained regarding Jews. The support for the dissociation hypothesis implies that changing beliefs about the traits of stereotypic groups may be ineffective in changing prejudice against those groups.

Imagine the following scenario (based on a true story):
Lisa comes from a white, liberal family. Her parents always vote for Democratic candidates, favor affirmative action programs, and are strong believers in laws giving legal advantages to minorities. Further, her parents strongly approved of her decision to go to a university where the majority of the faculty and students are of an extremely liberal bent. She met a Jewish student there named Yitzak, and they fell in love. During spring break, Lisa told her parents that she intended to marry Yitzak. Given her parents’ history of support for pro-minority positions and rejection of anti-minority ones, Lisa was surprised when her parents strongly objected to the impending marriage. Lisa responded to their unwillingness to have her marry a Jewish man by asking “What happened to your pro-minority viewpoint?” “This is different,” they replied.

Why did Lisa’s parents object to the marriage? There are several possibilities. First, the parents may have been lying about their pro-Jewish viewpoint. Second, feelings of compunction (guilt and self-criticism) may have caused them to support pro-Jewish positions despite having beliefs that Jews have negative traits (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, and Elliot, 1991). The negative trait judgments gained increased importance when the situation (marriage toward the daughter) was personally relevant. Third, the parents’ negative affect toward Jews caused them to make negative trait judgments about Yitzak (Jussim, Nelson, Manis, and Soffin, 1995), which in turn caused them to reject him as a potential husband for their daughter. Finally, Lisa’s parents may have made positive trait judgments about Jews, and about Yitzak, but still experienced negative affect toward their daughter marrying a Jew that was separate from the trait judgments (in other words, trait judgments and affect can be dissociated from each other). Their negative position toward their daughter’s marriage may have been based on the negative affect rather than on the positive trait judgments. Each of these possibilities doubtless applies to at least a few cases, but the goal of this article is to test the last possibility—which we will call the dissociation hypothesis.

BACKGROUND

NEGATIVE TRAIT JUDGMENTS ABOUT MEMBERS OF STEREOTYPIC GROUPS

Much research has documented the fact that people often make negative trait judgments about outgroups (Katz and Braly, 1933). These negative judgments can
have a multitude of sources. Some of these are motivational. For example, people have been said to form negative judgments about outgroups in order to provide an excuse for exploiting them (McWilliams, 1948), to increase one's own self-esteem by downward comparison (Murphy, 1946), to displace “unacceptable” aggressive impulses (Parsons, 1947), or to provide a scapegoat (Baek, 1947).

There are also cognitive sources. For example, the illusory correlation literature (Hamilton and Gifford, 1976) suggests that when distinctive events co-occur, they are seen to be correlated. So, for instance, when a Jew (distinctive person) performs a socially unacceptable behavior (distinctive event) people perceive the two as going together more often than is actually the case. Other researchers have argued that people have stereotypes about outgroups that bias judgments by acting as schemas, base rates, hypotheses, or implicit personality theories (Biernat and Vescio, 1993; Ginosar and Trope, 1980; Hewstone, Hantzi, and Johnston, 1991; Schneider, Hastorf, and Ellsworth, 1979; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, and Rudermann, 1978).

Possibly as a reaction to the large number of studies dealing with cognitive variables, there has been a recent effort on the part of researchers to examine affect as a precursor to negative trait judgments. For example, Jussim et al. (1995) told participants that either rock music performers or child abusers had given various word definitions and, on the basis of these definitions, asked them to make trait judgments about the target persons. They found that affect toward the target group was significantly associated with these judgments even after controlling for various kinds of beliefs. Of course, as the authors acknowledge, it is possible that they measured the “wrong” beliefs, and that controlling for the “right” beliefs would have eliminated the affect-judgment link. Unfortunately, the fact that affect and beliefs are usually in the same direction makes it difficult to tease apart their separate effects.

**WHY ARE NEGATIVE TRAIT JUDGMENTS ABOUT OUTGROUPS IMPORTANT?**

Regardless of whether negative trait judgments of outgroups (sometimes these are called stereotypes) are the result of motivation, cognition, affect, or some combination, it has been widely assumed that they are the prime determinant of prejudice (Stroebe and Insko, 1989). Consequently, a great deal of literature has been devoted to changing them (see Stephan and Stephan, 1996, for a review). Underlying this research is an assumption that if negative trait judgments toward outgroups were changed, then prejudice based on them would also change (Hilton and Von Hippel, 1990; Rothbart and John, 1985).

Unfortunately, although large numbers of researchers have investigated the effect of disconfirming information on trait judgments, the usual conclusion is that they are extremely difficult to change (see Hewstone, 1989, for a review). One problem is that members of stereotypic groups who contradict people’s trait judgments can be subtyped, thereby leaving the original stereotype untouched (Allport, 1954, 1958; Johnston and Hewstone, 1992; Weber and Crocker, 1983). Another problem is that disconfirming members may not be associated with the stereotype category label (Rothbart and John, 1985). Thus, because of the difficulty in changing stereotypic trait judgments about outgroups, most reviews of the literature have come to pessimistic conclusions about reducing prejudice.

There is some research (Haddock, Zanna, and Esses, 1994; LaPierre, 1934), however, suggesting that trait judgments are not everything. Haddock et al. (1994) found that affect, symbolic beliefs, and previous experience with outgroup members can each, under particular circumstances, increase the prediction of prejudicial attitudes above and beyond that which can be obtained by trait judgments alone. In fact, they further found that trait judgments are sometimes not even the most important predictor
of prejudicial attitudes. Finally, although trait judgments were correlated with prejudicial attitudes, they were not, upon consideration of affect and symbolic beliefs, uniquely predictive of them.

Given the Haddock et al. (1994) findings as a starting point, we might engage in further speculation. Consider, for the moment, an argument by Fishbein (1980; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) that attitudes can vary, depending on the behavior of concern. For example, attitudes toward letting black males on one’s basketball team may differ substantially from attitudes toward letting them into one’s law firm. Everyone “knows” that black males are good at basketball (so it is a good idea to let them on your basketball team) and not intelligent (so it is a bad idea to let them into your law firm), so attitudes are likely to be more positive toward the former than toward the latter behavior. Interestingly, in the case of Jews, the opposite seems likely to be true. That is, attitudes would probably be more positive toward letting Jews into law firms than toward letting them onto basketball teams. More generally, different trait judgments may be relevant for attitudes toward different behaviors. However, we would like to go further, and speculate that for some behaviors prejudice is not based at all on trait judgments, even when the trait judgments are relevant!

Why might trait judgments be dissociated from prejudicial attitudes toward some behaviors? There are several possibilities. For example, consideration of some behaviors might prime memories of previous experience with members of the outgroup under consideration. These primed memories, in turn, might determine prejudicial attitudes. It is also possible that there are some behaviors where the traits of the outgroup under consideration have no consequences for the person. In this case, other variables (e.g., symbolic beliefs) may determine prejudicial attitudes, especially if they imply consequences for the person. In addition, some behaviors may be so personally relevant that the consideration of an outgroup member involved in the behavior triggers a great deal of affect. In such a case, where there is a high level of affect, the affect itself may serve as information (Schwarz and Clore, 1983; Strack, Schwarz, and Gschneidinger, 1985) leading to prejudicial attitudes. Finally, according to social-identity/self-categorization theory (e.g., Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell, 1987), favoring the in-group over the outgroup can increase self-esteem, even when such favoritism is to the individual’s own disadvantage (Turner, 1978)! Thus, prejudice can be based on many variables (priming, relevance, self-esteem, and others) other than negative trait judgments about the outgroup. In sum, according to the dissociation hypothesis, it should be possible to find behaviors where trait judgments that would normally be considered to be attitudinally relevant are dissociated from the attitude.

In the experiments to be reported, participants were asked to rate Jewish or Christian males on a variety of traits that previous research has shown to be highly relevant to what women desire in a potential mate. Later on, participants indicated their attitude toward their daughter (if they had one) marrying a Jewish or Christian man. Previous research (Eaton, 1994; Marshall and Markstrom-Adams, 1995; Sousa, 1995) suggests that attitudes toward intermarriage with Jews are related to prejudice against Jews. (It is also interesting to note research by Basavarajappa, Norris, and Hall [1988] indicating that many Jews also have negative attitudes toward intermarriage with Christians.) We assumed that participants would make relatively positive trait judgments about Jews, but would still feel some kind of negative affect or uneasiness where Jews are concerned (Gerber, 1986; Lukaszewski, 1995; Mayer, 1961; Wilson, 1996). Given this, the dissociation hypothesis predicts that although participants may give Jews superior trait ratings, they will also be unwilling to have their daughter marry one.
EXPERIMENT 1 METHOD

PARTICIPANTS

Thirty-five male and 43 female undergraduate students at New Mexico State University volunteered to participate in this study. Seventy-two percent of the participants identified themselves as Christians, 1 participant was a Bahai, and the remainder did not identify themselves as members of a particular religion.

PROCEDURE

Participants completed a questionnaire. The first 10 items required half of the participants to rate Jewish men on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 5 (extreme) on the top 10 characteristics that women want most in a man (obtained from Gilmour, 1988). These characteristics were (1) a record of achievement, (2) leadership qualities, (3) skill at job, (4) earning potential, (5) sense of humor, (6) intellectual ability, (7) attentiveness, (8) common sense, (9) athletic ability, and (10) good abstract reasoning. Later on, these participants rated (on the same 0 to 5 scale) how much they “would be willing,” if they had a daughter, to have her marry a Jewish man. The other half of the participants performed a similar task, but pertaining to “Christian men.”

RESULTS

Let us first consider participants’ willingness to have their daughter marry a Jew or a Christian. Consistent with previous research on prejudice toward Jews, participants were more willing to have their daughter marry a Christian than a Jew (M = 3.86 and M = 3.31), t(76) = 2.30, p < .05 (standard deviations are .99 and 1.11, respectively). Further, this effect was not moderated by sex differences F(1, 74) < 1.

Suppose that the underlying reason for the finding is that people believe that Jews have less positive traits than do Christians. In this case, we would expect lower trait ratings in the Jewish condition than in the Christian one. In contrast to this prediction, but consistent with the dissociation hypothesis, participants had more positive trait ratings about Jews than about Christians. Table 1 indicates that Jews were rated more positively than Christians on 8 of the 10 traits, which, according to the binomial test, is significantly greater than chance (p < .05).

A more formal index of the positivity of trait ratings about Jews and Christians was constructed by weighting the response to each question by its perceived importance (according to research by Gilmour, 1988) and summing these products. Consistent with Table 2, the trait index was more favorable in the Jewish than in the Christian condition (M = 198.38 and M = 185.63), t(72) = 1.82, p < .05 (standard deviations are 28.46 and 31.31, respectively). Thus, it seems that the participants had more positive trait ratings, but showed more prejudice, toward Jews than toward Christians. More generally, these data provide preliminary support for the dissociation hypothesis.

CORRELATIONAL ANALYSES

The dissociation hypothesis suggests an additional statistical analysis. Suppose that a correlation coefficient was computed between trait ratings about Jews and willingness to have one’s daughter marry one. If willingness is based, at least in part, on trait ratings about the target group, then a significant correlation should be obtained. In contrast, if prejudice is dissociated from those trait ratings, then no correlation should result. The dissociation hypothesis predicts that when the target person is a member of a nonstereotypic group (i.e., Christians), then willingness should be based on, and correlated with, trait ratings (as any expectancy-value model would predict). But when the target person is a member of a stereotypic group (i.e., Jews), then the correlation should disappear.

An obvious way of testing this prediction is to look at the correlation between the trait index computed above and willingness to have a daughter marry a member of the
target group (i.e., a Jew or a Christian). Consistent with the dissociation hypothesis, although there was a correlation in the Christian condition \( (r = .42, p < .01) \), this was not the case in the Jewish condition \( (r = .16, p > .1) \).

SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES

It is possible that the above support for the dissociation hypothesis was due to the inclusion of some inappropriate (for our population of participants) trait ratings in the trait index. In order to address this problem, a Principle Components Factor Analysis was conducted on the trait ratings. Table 2 indicates that 6 of the 10 traits loaded on the first factor. Consequently, a “trait” score that was used in subsequent analyses was computed for each participant by averaging across these six traits. It is interesting to note that, consistent with Table 1, trait scores were greater in the Jewish condition than in the Christian one \( (M = 3.42 \text{ and } M = 3.11) \), \( t(76) = 2.03, p < .05 \) (standard deviations are .58 and .75, respectively).

According to the hypothesis, trait scores should be correlated with the willingness question in the Christian condition but not in the Jewish one. This is precisely what happened. The correlation in the Christian condition was \( .65 \) (\( p < .001 \)), but in the Jewish condition it was only .13, not discernibly different from zero. Thus, even with some of the traits excluded on the basis of the factor analysis, the support for the dissociation hypothesis remained.

EXPERIMENT 2

Although the data clearly support the dissociation hypothesis, there are some alternative interpretations that need to be considered. For example, perhaps willingness to have one’s daughter marry someone depends on judgments about negative as well as positive traits. Another possibility is that people believe it is “bad” for their daughter to marry someone of a different religion. Experiment 2 addresses these issues.

METHOD

PARTICIPANTS

Thirty-eight male and 52 female undergraduate students at New Mexico State University volunteered to participate in the present experiment. Seventy-five percent of the participants identified themselves as Christians, 3% as Jews, and the remainder did not identify themselves with a religion.

PROCEDURE

The procedure was similar to that used in Experiment 1, except that the traits used were about undesirable rather than desirable qualities that men have. Because Gilmour (1988) did not report such traits, we were forced to conduct a pilot study to obtain them. Female participants in the pilot study wrote down “the 10 least desirable qualities that you would not want in a man,” here listed in order of decreasing importance: (1) insensitive, (2) unmotivated, (3) chauvinistic, (4) abusive, (5) dependent, (6) dishonest, (7) incompetent, (8) drugs/alcohol, (9) no religion/wrong religion, (10) no family ties. Participants in the main study were asked to rate Jewish men on these negative traits and, later on, these participants also rated (on the same 0 to 5 scale) how much they “would be willing,” if they had a daughter, to have her marry a Jewish man. The other half of the participants performed a similar task, but pertaining to “Christian men.”

RESULTS

Let us first consider participants’ willingness to have their daughter marry a Jew or a Christian. Consistent with Experiment 1, participants were more willing to have their daughter marry a Christian than a Jew \( (M = 3.57 \text{ and } M = 2.98) \), \( t(88) = 2.62, p < .02 \) (standard deviations are 1.06 and 1.10, respectively). Further, this effect was not moderated by sex differences, \( F(1, 85) < 1 \).
Consistent with the dissociation hypothesis, participants gave less negative trait ratings about Jews than about Christians. Table 3 indicates that participants thought Jews are significantly (p < .05) less negative when it comes to being unmotivated, dependent, incompetent, on drugs/alcohol, or having no family ties. Jews were also thought to be marginally (p < .1) less likely to be abusive or dishonest. More generally, Christian men were thought to be more negative than Jewish men in every category.

A more formal index of the negativity of trait judgments about Jews and Christians was constructed by weighing the response to each question by its perceived importance and summing these products (as in Experiment 1). Consistent with Table 3, the trait index was less negative in the Jewish than in the Christian condition (M = 74.60 and M = 105.16), t(85) = 2.70, p < .01 (standard deviations are 57.21 and 48.18, respectively). Thus, it seems that the participants had less negative trait judgments, but showed more prejudice, toward Jews than toward Christians. Clearly, these data are consistent with the dissociation hypothesis.

CORRELATIONAL ANALYSES

We conducted correlational analyses that were similar to those in Experiment 1. In contrast to the previous findings, however, the trait index failed to correlate significantly with participants' willingness to have their daughter marry in either the Jewish or Christian condition (r = -.22 and r = -.16, p > .1 in both conditions). Further, none of the items, taken singly, were significantly correlated with willingness to have one’s daughter marry a Jew or Christian. Thus, there is no evidence that willingness to have one’s daughter marry a Jew or a Christian is based on negative traits.

SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES

As in Experiment 1, the trait ratings were factor analyzed. Unfortunately, as Table 4 indicates, the factor analysis came out much less clearly than in Experiment 1 (see Table 2). Nevertheless, the trait ratings that loaded more highly on the first factor were averaged to provide one trait index, and those that loaded more highly on the second factor were averaged to provide a second trait index. Then the previous analyses were rerun with these new trait measures. Consistent with the other findings, Jews were rated as being less negative than Christians (p < .01 on both trait indexes) and there was essentially no correlation between traits on either index and willingness to have one’s daughter marry either a Jew or a Christian (p > .1 in all cases).

DISCUSSION

The results can be summarized as follows. First, Jewish males were rated as being more positive, and less negative, than Christian males. Second, despite this, participants were less willing to have their daughter marry a Jew than a Christian. Third, willingness to have one’s daughter marry a Christian was highly correlated with positive trait judgments about Christians, but there was no correlation when Jews were the target group (Experiment 1). These findings support the dissociation hypothesis. Further, the fact that negative trait judgments were uncorrelated with willingness to have one’s daughter marry either a Jew or a Christian suggests that this attitude is not based on negative trait judgments.

Before speculating on the implications of the dissociation hypothesis, some possible limitations must first be addressed. For example, the hypothesis was only tested with respect to Jewish males (with Christian males as the control condition) and two sets of particular traits. Future research is needed to extend the hypothesis to other groups, to the female sex, and to other sets of traits.

In order to be “politically correct” it is possible that participants were unwilling to say anything negative about Jews. However, if this was true, then participants should not
have expressed less willingness to have a daughter marry a Jew than a Christian. Further, on the one positive trait (Experiment 1) where Jews have traditionally (Katz and Braly, 1933; Tunis, 1943) been thought to be deficient (i.e., athletic ability), participants did give Jews significantly lower trait ratings than Christians. Thus, political correctness does not provide a plausible explanation of the data.

Finally, it is possible that having one’s daughter marry a Jew is contrary to the participants’ religious beliefs. However, three types of evidence militate against this explanation. First, Jews were not rated worse than Christians on the “religion” trait. Second, ratings of both Jews and Christians on that trait were uncorrelated with participants’ willingness to have their daughter marry one.

A third type of evidence was obtained from an informal study performed during class. We asked the students to rate their willingness to have their daughter (if they had one) marry a Jew, and they were then asked to circle the reason. The reasons they could have circled for not being willing were: (1) Jews have negative traits; (2) Jews do not have positive traits; (3) the thought of my daughter marrying a Jew makes me uneasy; (4) God will punish my daughter if she marries a Jew; (5) God will punish me if my daughter marries a Jew; (6) society will punish my daughter if she marries a Jew; (7) society will punish me if my daughter marries a Jew; (8) a Jew is particularly likely to hurt my daughter; (9) none of the above are even close. Note that except for (3), all of the others imply consequences coming from outside the participant; i.e., from the traits of the Jew, from God, or from society. If, as the religiosity hypothesis predicts, participants who were unwilling to have their daughter marry a Jew considered these consequences in their decision, then they should have circled one of them. In contrast, however, 83% of these participants circled reason (3), that “the thought of my daughter marrying a Jew makes me uneasy.”

THREE UNSOLVED PUZZLES

One puzzling aspect of the data concerns the correlation between trait judgments about Christians and willingness to have one’s daughter marry one in Experiment 1 (positive traits) but not in Experiment 2 (negative traits). One possibility is that the issue of marriage (presumably a positive event) primes people to think in terms of positive traits rather than negative ones. A second possibility is that positive traits (e.g., intelligence) are considered to be difficult or impossible to acquire and therefore gain increased weight. Doubtless there are other possibilities. Unfortunately, there is no way at present to distinguish between them.

The evidence obtained in favor of the dissociation hypothesis suggests a second puzzle. Specifically, although it is now clear that trait judgments are not responsible for participants’ attitudes toward having their daughter marry a Jew, it is not clear exactly what is responsible. One possibility is that negative affect toward Jews directly affects willingness to have a daughter marry one (not mediated by trait judgments). Further, it is possible that any kind of “different” stimulus can cause negative affect. A second possibility is that people worry about what others will say (although the data presented in the previous section suggest otherwise). Finally, perhaps having one’s daughter marry a Jew implies some kind of potential threat to one’s belief system.

There is a third, more abstract puzzle that is not well addressed by the present data. Specifically, although “old-style” racism (e.g., the Holocaust) is based on an assumption that the outgroup under consideration has inferior traits, more recent literature (see Stephan and Stephan, 1996, for a review) suggests that a “newer” racism can be based on an assumption that the outgroup is merely different (and the nature of the differences may not even have to be specified). Thus, stereotypes in the “newer” sense are not collections of trait judgments about the outgroup’s inferiority but
are something else or have an additional component. For example, one can characterize stereotypes as having a trait component and/or an affective component (given the hatred of the Jews during the Holocaust, the affective component may also apply to "old-style" racism). Possibly, depending on the outgroup and/or behavior of concern, either of these components may be dissociated from prejudice. If this is true, it should be possible for future researchers to demonstrate cases when affect does not predict prejudice as well as when it does.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERVENTION**

The dissociation hypothesis has disturbing implications for stereotype change. It is a truism in social psychology that prejudicial attitudes are difficult to change. But researchers have often assumed that if specific negative trait judgments about stereotypic groups could be decreased or made positive (which is difficult in itself), then prejudice directed at those groups should likewise decrease. The present support for the dissociation hypothesis suggests otherwise. Given that trait judgments about some stereotypic groups can be dissociated from prejudice against them (at least for some behaviors), there is reason to suspect that interventions designed to change negative trait judgments will fail to affect prejudice (for those behaviors). On the other hand, perhaps trait judgments are indirectly associated with prejudice and so these interventions might be effective after all.

So what should be done? Before any interventions are attempted, it is important to determine whether or not the dissociation hypothesis holds for the groups and/or behaviors of concern. For those groups and/or behaviors where the hypothesis does not hold, then changing trait judgments might be an effective way to proceed. For those stereotypic groups of concern where the dissociation hypothesis does hold, however, an additional study must be performed to determine the causes of prejudice or if there is an indirect association between trait judgments and prejudice. (Possibly there will be different causes for prejudicial attitudes toward different behaviors, even within the same group.) At least two models seem potentially useful for guiding these studies. For example, Triandis (1980, 1994) has argued that among the causes of affect (including negative affect toward outgroups) are habit hierarchies, personality factors, and cultural factors. Intervention could focus on any of these as well as on the more traditional attitudes and subjective norms (e.g., Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) that are also implied in the model.

Stephan and his colleagues (Stephan and Stephan, 1996; Stephan, Ybarra, and Bachman, in press; Ybarra and Stephan, 1994) have argued that different kinds of perceived threat can affect attitudes toward stereotypic groups. There are two kinds of intergroup threats. These are symbolic threats based on the value differences between groups and realistic threats based on the possibility that the stereotypic group will actually annex power and recourses that can directly affect the well-being of the in-group. There is also an interpersonal threat caused by the anticipated anxiety of interacting with a member of the outgroup (remember that many participants expressed that having their daughter marry a Jew would make them feel “uneasy”). The relationship between these types of threat and prejudice has not been established, but the area holds promise for the future.

**ADDED MATERIAL**

DAVID TRAFIMOW; TAMI GANNON: What if Your Daughter Married a Jew?: The
David Trafimow received his Ph.D. from the University of Illinois at Champaign and is now Assistant Professor at New Mexico State University. His main area of research is social cognition. Within this broad domain, his more specific interests are in understanding how self-cognitions are organized, and the interrelationships between self-cognitions and presumed determinants of behavior (e.g., attitudes, subjective norms, control beliefs, and behavioral intentions). He is also interested in the cognitive structures underlying attributions and memory of events and persons.

Tami Gannon is a mother of three who graduated from New Mexico State University with a double major in psychology and criminal justice. She plans to complete a Master's degree in pre-clinical psychology with an emphasis in criminal psychology at Chapman College, and eventually a Ph.D. in criminal psychology.

Table 1. Trait Judgments About the Target Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trait</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Record of achievement</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership qualities</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skill at job</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>3.49</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earning potential</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of humor</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual ability</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attentiveness</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common sense</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athletic ability</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good abstract reasoning</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NS = not significant.

Table 2. Factor Loadings of Trait Judgments About the Target Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trait</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Record of achievement</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.82 (FN*)</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership qualities</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skill at job</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earning potential</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>-.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of humor</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual ability</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>-.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attentiveness</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common sense</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athletic ability</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good abstract reasoning</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FOOTNOTE

* The italics indicate the greatest factor loading for each trait judgment.

Table 3. Trait Judgments About the Target Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trait</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insensitive</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmotivated</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chauvinistic</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abusive</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dishonest</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompetent</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs/alcohol</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No/wrong religion</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No family ties</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NS = not significant.

Table 4. Factor Loadings of Trait Judgments About the Target Groups
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trait</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insensitive</td>
<td>.85(FN*)</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmotivated</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chauvinistic</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abusive</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dishonest</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompetent</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs/alcohol</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No/wrong religion</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No family ties</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FOOTNOTES

* The italics indicate the greatest factor loading for each trait judgment.

REFERENCES


