Evaluations of Sexually Active Men and Women Under Divided Attention: A Social Cognitive Approach to the Sexual Double Standard

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Past research on the sexual double standard has generally shown that both men and women are evaluated similarly, not differently, for engaging in high levels of sexual activity. However, the settings in which this research has taken place may have allowed participants to devote almost all of their cognitive resources to the task of evaluating sexually active men and women. Devoting one’s full attention to person evaluation may lead to individuation instead of stereotyping. This article reports a study designed to test the hypothesis that when attention is divided, people will evaluate men with many partners more favorably than women with many partners. Participants, under conditions of divided or full attention, evaluated male or female target persons with 1, 7, or 19 sexual partners. Participants in the divided attention condition exhibited a sexual double standard, whereas participants in the full attention condition did not.

The notion that men and women are evaluated differently for engaging in sexual activity is called the sexual double standard. Under the rubric of the sexual double standard, highly sexually active men are praised or rewarded with high status, whereas highly sexually active women are derogated or suffer a damaged reputation. The double standard has been extensively discussed by authors, journalists, and critics of contemporary Western culture, and its existence supported by copious anecdotal evidence. Perception of a sexual double standard is pervasive; the vast majority of people believe that one exists (see Marks & Fraley, 2005).

Empirical research, however, has not corroborated the intuitive belief that the sexual double standard exists. This may be because the typical research setting in which the double standard is studied may not accurately mimic real life situations in which stereotypes of highly sexually active men (i.e., “the stud”) and highly sexually active women (i.e., “the slut”) are most likely to be applied. Specifically, the environments in which sexual double standard studies are typically conducted allow participants to allocate almost all of their attentional resources to evaluating sexually active people. This may lead participants to individuate sexually active men and women instead of stereotyping them. Because stereotypes are conceptualized as attention-saving devices, they may be most likely to be applied when attentional resources are scarce, which is typically the situation in real life settings (L. L. Jacoby, Toth, Lindsay, & Debner, 1992).

In this article I argue that one reason why previous attempts to document the sexual double standard have been largely unsuccessful is that they failed to capitalize on the fact that stereotypes are likely to be applied when attentional resources are limited. I begin by discussing briefly the sexual double standard and research methods used to study it. Next, I discuss stereotypes and the likelihood of their application under differing levels of attention. Finally, I report a study designed to test the hypothesis that the sexual double standard will emerge when people are not permitted to allocate their full attentional resources to the task of evaluating sexually active men and women.
THE SEXUAL DOUBLE STANDARD

The sexual double standard has been a fixture in our culture for decades, receiving much attention from researchers, scholars, the media, and contemporary critics of Western culture. The way sexually active women are perceived has important implications for women's health (Gentry, 1998), sexual identity (Katz & Farrow, 2000), and women's portrayal in the media (Wagget, 1989), and writers have critiqued the way “slut bashing” enables sexual violence against women to persist (Malamuth & Check, 1981; Tanenbaum 2000). Given the importance and apparent prevalence of the sexual double standard in modern society, one would assume that behavioral scientists have documented the double standard extensively and have identified many of the processes that generate and sustain it.

Despite much systematic research, however, there is only weak empirical evidence for the existence of this allegedly pervasive phenomenon (e.g., Gentry, 1998; A. P. Jacoby & Williams, 1985; Mark & Miller, 1986; Marks & Fraley, 2005; Oliver & Sedikides, 1992; O'Sullivan, 1995; Sprecher, 1989; Sprecher, McKinney, Walsh, & Anderson, 1988; Sprecher, Regan, McKinney, Maxwell, & Wazienski, 1997). The person perception paradigm, which involves evaluating fictional men and women with varying levels of sexual experience, has been a popular method for studying the sexual double standard. As traditionally carried out, research employing a person perception paradigm typically reveals that judgments of sexually active men and women are based solely on the amount of sexual experience that the target has had, and not on the gender of the target. This paradigm, however, may fail to accurately capture the dynamics of how sexually active men and women are evaluated in real-life settings.

One important difference between research settings and real-life settings is that each setting allows for different amounts of attentional resources to be devoted to person evaluation. Specifically, research settings are typically quiet, are devoid of social and other distractions, and generally foster concentration on the task at hand. Because of the nonbusy nature of research settings, participants may allocate all of their attentional resources to evaluating a person. By contrast, the world outside the research space is rich, detailed, and full of stimuli that must be attended to. Busy environments constrain the attentional resources available for processing social information (Sherman, Lee, Bessenoff, & Frost, 1998), making person evaluation more difficult.

This difference is crucial because the amount of attentional resources that a person has available impacts the likelihood that he or she will use stereotypes when evaluating people that belong to a specific social group. Stereotypes have been characterized as efficient, energy-saving devices that allow people to reduce cognitive effort when thinking about things (Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994; Pratto & Bargh, 1991; Sherman & Bessenoff, 1999). By categorizing people into social groups, perceivers can reduce the amount of information they must attend to, eliminating the need to form individual impressions of each member of that category (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). On the basis of a target’s group membership, perceivers can efficiently infer that target’s personality characteristics without fully attending to his or her behavior. This efficiency is important, because the social world is full of stimuli that must be attended to, processed, and understood. When the environment contains a sufficient level of stimuli and perceivers’ resources are correspondingly exhausted, stereotypes are likely to be activated and applied in judgmental tasks (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1993; Macrae et al., 1993; Pratto & Bargh, 1991; but see Gilbert & Hixon, 1991).

By contrast, when people are allowed to devote all of their attention to evaluating others, they may individuate that person instead of stereotyping him or her. Individualization involves forming impressions of people based on a wide array of information, rather than forming impressions based on simple group membership. Unlike stereotyping, which involves attributing traits to a person based on his or her social group, individuation involves viewing a person as a distinct individual and not as part of a specific social group. Because of the high level of attention required to identify and process numerous specific pieces of information about a person, individuation is rather demanding of cognitive resources (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990).

Because most person perception studies allow participants to focus their attention on evaluating sexually active men and women, they may foster the individuation of sexually active men and women. However, real-life situations rarely allow individuals to devote the majority of their attention to evaluating sexually active men and women. Gender stereotypes exist such that men are regarded as more sexually permissive than women (Cohen & Shotland, 1996; Oliver & Hyde, 1993); when evaluations are made under conditions of divided attention (i.e., when perceivers lack the cognitive resources to notice and process individuating information), they are more likely to be consistent with stereotypes of sexually active men (e.g., “stud”) and women (e.g., “slut”).

OVERVIEW

The goal of this study is to test the hypothesis that the sexual double standard will emerge under conditions
of divided attention. Participants were randomly assigned to either a full or divided attention condition and evaluated a man or a woman who had 1, 7, or 19 sexual partners. If the sexual double standard is conditional on depleted attention, participants in the divided attention condition should exhibit a sexual double standard such that at higher levels of sexual activity, women will be evaluated less favorably than men.

METHOD

Design

This study involves a 2 (attention level) × 2 (target sex) × 3 (target sexual experience) between-subjects design. Exploratory analyses revealed no effects of participant sex, alone or in interaction with other variables. Therefore, responses were collapsed across participant sex. The independent variables in this study were attention level (full or divided), target gender, and target sexual experience (1, 7, or 19 partners). The dependent variable was participants’ evaluation of the target person. An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests.

Participants

According to a priori power analyses assuming a large effect size, approximately 77 participants would be needed to have a power of at least .80 to detect the critical three-way interaction between target sex, sexual experience, and attention level that would indicate that sexually active men and women are evaluated differently at different levels of attention. Participant hour allocations allowed for 72 students (34 men, 38 women) to be recruited from a midwestern university to participate for credit in their introduction to psychology class. The average participant age was 19.0 years old (SD = 0.8, range = 18–21). Approximately 72% of the participants were white. Postexperiment analyses indicated equivalence between conditions on age, t(70) = -.30, and sex, \( \chi^2(1) = 3.57, \) all ps > .05.

Procedure

Participants signed up for a nondescript study. Upon arrival to the experiment, participants were told they would be performing a person evaluation task in which they would read about and evaluate a person. To avoid demand characteristics, no mention of the purpose of the study, sexual activity, or gender was made. Participants were tested individually and were assured of the anonymity of their responses. In all conditions, participants read a one-page vignette about a 19-year-old man or woman who had 1, 7, or 19 sexual partners. After reading the vignette once, participants evaluated the target by indicating how much they agreed with each of 15 sentences about the target. Participants were allowed to refer back to the vignette as needed. Half an hour was allotted to the experiment, which was sufficient for all participants.

In the full attention condition, participants performed the experiment as just described. In the divided attention condition, participants were required to rehearse an eight-digit number for the duration of the experiment. Before the participant began reading the vignette, he or she was shown a slip of paper with an eight-digit number written on it. Participants were allowed 30 sec to verbally rehearse the number. After 30 sec, the slip of paper was removed from the participant’s view, and he or she completed the experiment as previously described while continuing to verbally rehearse the number in a manner audible to the experimenter. Specifically, participants read the vignette and completed the evaluation items while continually rehearsing the number out loud at a rate of one full repetition every 3 to 4 sec. After completing the experiment, participants were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.

Materials

The vignette consisted of a sheet of paper containing five questions (counterbalanced for order) and handwritten answers to those questions purportedly written by an anonymous 19-year-old individual (see Appendix A). Participants were told that the questions were from a survey issued to the general public and that the answers were written by an anonymous person who consented to having his or her answers used in another study. Targets were male or female and reported having 1, 7, or 19 sexual partners. Information concerning the target’s sexual activity was conveyed in response to the question, “What is something someone may not know about you?”

After reading the target’s answers, participants completed a general evaluation scale consisting of 15 evaluative items (see Appendix B). The items were selected from a larger set of 20 items issued in a pilot study and encompassed a wide variety of domains, including assertiveness, intelligence, power, and achievement. These domains have been shown in past double standard studies to be sensitive to the amount of sexual experience target persons have had (Gentry, 1998; Sprecher, McKinney, & Orbuch, 1987). Based on a reliability analysis of the pilot data, 5 items were removed, resulting in the 15-item scale used in this study. A principal components analysis was run on the final 15 items. Three factors emerged, roughly representing success, dominance, and intelligence. Three scale
scores were formed by averaging the items in each factor, and preliminary analyses were conducted using the scale means as dependent variables. Because all three scales showed similar patterns of results, all 15 items were averaged to reduce redundancy and maximize reliability. Cronbach’s alpha for this sample was .76.

Items were presented singly in random order on a computer monitor. Each item consisted of a one-sentence statement regarding the target. Participants were asked to report the gender of the target and how many sexual partners the target had. These 2 items were removed from the participant’s view, and the participant was asked to report the gender of the target and how many sexual partners the target had. These 2 items were included as a manipulation check and were answered correctly by all participants. After the completion of the experiment, participants were thanked and debriefed.

RESULTS

Participants’ evaluations were analyzed in a three-way analysis of variance with load, target sex, and partners as factors. The results are illustrated in Figure 1. The overall model was significant, $F(11, 60) = 2.16$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .28$. The main effect of sexual experience approached statistical significance, $F(2, 60) = 3.10$, $p = .053$, partial $\eta^2 = .09$, such that participants rated targets with 19 sexual partners ($M = 3.35, SD = 0.44$) more favorably than targets with 7 ($M = 3.10, SD = 0.36$) or 1 ($M = 3.20, SD = 0.30$) sexual partners. Main effects of target sex and attention level did not reach statistical significance, nor did any of the two-way interactions. The critical three-way interaction, however, was statistically significant, $F(2, 60) = 3.56$, $p < .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .11$.

To interpret the three-way interaction, post hoc analyses of variance were conducted within each attention level condition, with target sex and target sexual experience as independent variables. In the full attention condition, the overall model was not significant, $F(5, 30) = 0.93$, ns, partial $\eta^2 = .14$, and there were no main effects or interactions. In the divided attention condition, the overall model was significant, $F(5, 30) = 4.03$, $p < .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .40$. There was a main effect of target sex, $F(1, 30) = 7.43$, $p < .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .20$, such that male targets ($M = 3.40, SD = 0.37$) were rated more favorably than female targets ($M = 3.10, SD = 0.37$). The interaction between target sex and sexual experience was significant, $F(2, 30) = 5.32, p < .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .26$.

Follow-up $t$ tests in the divided attention condition revealed no differences between the evaluations of men and women in the 1 partner ($M = 3.27, SD = 0.19$; $M = 3.23, SD = 0.31$ for men and women, respectively) and 7 partner ($M = 3.18, SD = 0.38$; $M = 3.13, SD = 0.44$ for men and women, respectively) conditions. However, in the 19 partner condition, men ($M = 3.76, SD = 0.26$) were evaluated more positively than women ($M = 2.94, SD = 0.35$), $t(10) = 4.51, p < .05$, $d = 2.61$. See Table 1 for all descriptive statistics.

Comparisons across target sex were also made. In the full attention condition, evaluations did not differ across number of partners for male targets, $F(5, 12) = 0.43, ns$, partial $\eta^2 = .14$, or female targets, $F(5, 12) = 0.69, ns$, partial $\eta^2 = .22$. There were no main effects or interactions. In the divided attention condition, the model for male targets was significant, $F(5, 12) = 6.95, p < .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .74$. There was no main effect of target sex, but there was a main effect of partners, $F(5, 12) = 13.84, p < .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .70$, such that male targets with 19 partners ($M = 3.76, SD = 0.26$) were rated higher than male targets with 7 partners ($M = 3.18, SD = 0.37$), $t(10) = 3.07, p < .05$, $d = 1.77$, and 1 partner ($M = 3.27, SD = 0.19$), $t(10) = 3.71$.

### TABLE 1

Mean Ratings of Targets at Each Level of Gender, Sexual Experience, and Cognitive Load

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full Attention</th>
<th>Divided Attention</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partners</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>0.21</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>0.40</td>
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Note, $n = 6$ in each cell. Higher ratings (on a scale of 1–5) indicate more positive evaluations.
The model for female targets in the load condition did not reach statistical significance, $F(5, 12) = 1.32, ns$, partial $r^2 = .36$. Female targets with 19 partners ($M = 2.94, SD = 0.35$) were rated lower than female targets with 7 partners ($M = 3.12, SD = 0.44$), $t(10) = -0.79, ns$, $d = -0.45$, and 1 partner ($M = 3.23, SD = 0.30$), $t(10) = 1.49, p = .16, d = -.88$.

Finally, evaluations of male and female targets were compared across load conditions at each level of sexual experience. There were no differences in evaluations of male and female targets in the 1 and 7 partner conditions. In the 19 partner condition, participants in the divided attention rated male targets more positively ($M = 3.76, SD = 0.26$) than did participants in the full attention condition ($M = 3.30, SD = 0.40$), $t(10) = 2.36, p < .05, d = 1.36$. Also in the 19 partner condition, participants in the divided attention rated female targets more negatively ($M = 2.94, SD = 0.35$) than did participants in the full attention condition ($M = 3.41, SD = 0.40$), $t(10) = 2.14, p = .05, d = 1.23$.

**DISCUSSION**

This study was designed to test the hypothesis that under conditions of divided attention, a sexual double standard would emerge such that sexually active men would be evaluated more positively than equally sexually active women. The hypothesis was supported by the data. When allowed to devote their full attention to evaluating sexually active men and women, participants rated men and women equally in each partner condition. However, under conditions of divided attention, participants evaluated highly sexually active men much more positively than highly sexually active women.

Ratings for each gender across number of partners revealed that in the divided attention condition, male targets with 19 partners were rated more positively than male targets with 1 or 7 partners. Although there were no statistically significant differences in the evaluations of female targets with differing amounts of sexual experience, there were moderately large differences (based on Cohen's $d$) in evaluations such that female targets with 19 partners were rated more negatively than female targets with 1 or 7 partners. Moreover, in the 19 partner condition, ratings for male targets were more positive in the divided attention condition than the full attention condition, whereas ratings for female targets were more negative in the divided attention condition than the full attention condition. These results support the conclusion that positive stereotypes of highly sexually active men and negative stereotypes of sexually highly active women are activated and applied when cognitive resources are limited.

The specific stereotypes that were activated are likely related to the nature of the items in the questionnaire (i.e., related to success, dominance and intelligence). Regarding highly sexually active women, stereotypes that were activated possibly include the “gold digger,” a woman who sleeps with men to acquire resources (e.g., child support, welfare); the “easy woman,” a woman who lets men have their way with her (e.g., submissive, nondominant); and the “skank,” a woman who recklessly engages in sex despite the risks (e.g., disease, damaged reputation, unwanted pregnancy). All of these stereotypes clearly have negative connotations. By contrast, stereotypes of highly sexually active men are quite positive. These stereotypes include the “stud,” a dominant, alpha male type; the “playboy,” an affluent and high-status pleasure-seeking type; or the “player,” a man who successfully and skillfully manipulates many women into sleeping with him.

The effects just discussed primarily occurred in the 19 partner condition; even while under cognitive load, participants evaluated men and women with 1 and 7 partners equally. One possible reason this effect occurred only in the 19 partner condition is that it is not unusual for young adults to have seven or fewer sexual partners. Supporting this explanation, a recent study by Ostovich and Sabini (2004) featured a sample of male and female participants with a modal age of 19 for each gender. Male participants reported having a mean of 4.4 ($SD = 8.9$) lifetime partners, and female participants reported having a mean of 2.7 ($SD = 6.3$) lifetime partners. Moreover, in an Internet survey of sexual attitudes, respondents replied with a mean of approximately 8 for men and 6 for women when asked what a “normal” amount of lifetime sexual partners would be for a person (Marks, 2002). The 19 partner condition may thus characterize an extreme of sexual activity among young adults, calling to mind the stereotypical representation of the “stud” or “slut.” When under cognitive load, individuals may have difficulty incorporating individuating information into their conceptualization of highly sexually active men and women, making sexual stereotypes highly likely to be activated and applied. Moreover, 19 sexual partners may be a larger deviation from what is “normal” for women than what is “normal” for men. Under this “shifting standards” framework (Biernat, Kobyrowicz, & Weber, 2003; Biernat & Manis, 1994), cognitive load accentuates the evaluation of the target based on within-sex standards, leading to accentuation of stereotyping in objective judgments.

These results have several implications for the conceptualization of the sexual double standard. The primary implication of this study is that the sexual double standard may be more prevalent than indicated by past research. Because divided attention is the norm...
in most situations (see Gilbert, Krull, & Pelham, 1988; L. L. Jacoby et al., 1992), the application of stereotypes to sexually active men and women may be much more common than indicated by previous research.

Another implication of these results is that the person perception paradigm as traditionally carried out may not be particularly useful for studying the sexual double standard. Simply varying targets’ gender and sexual experience fails to capture the dynamics that occur when real men and women are evaluated by others. Moreover, even characteristics of respondents (e.g., amount of sexual experience, sex-typing) which may have important moderating effects on the double standard may be undermined by the person perception paradigm in its simplest form. When conducting a person perception study, it is important to consider the social cognitive mechanisms that underlie judgmental and evaluative tasks.

For example, Marks and Fraley (2006, 2007) conducted studies that highlight the value of taking a social cognitive approach to understanding the sexual double standard. In one such study, Marks and Fraley (2006) considered schema theories suggesting that expectancy-congruent information is more easily incorporated into memory than expectancy-incongruent information. Based on these theories, they hypothesized that people would remember social information consistent with the double standard and forget or fail to encode information inconsistent with it. Results showed that information consistent with the double standard (e.g., a woman being derogated for engaging in sexual activity) is more likely to be remembered than information inconsistent with the double standard (e.g., a woman being praised for engaging in sexual activity).

In another study, Marks and Fraley (2007) hypothesized that people are more likely to endorse a double standard while in a group than when alone because social interaction is likely to make social norms more salient. They found that when people are by themselves, a sexual double standard did not emerge. However, when people were placed in groups and collaboratively evaluated a target person, a double standard did emerge. In other words, people exhibited a double standard publicly but not privately. Although the authors mainly attributed this effect to informational influence, it can also be understood in light of the results presented here. Social interaction is a complex affair in which people must consciously monitor and regulate their own actions while drawing inferences about others (Gilbert et al., 1988). As such, social interaction may cause interactants to become cognitively busy, resulting in the increase of stereotype use. If this is the case, social interaction may be an especially strong catalyst for the sexual double standard, not only because of the increased salience of social norms but because of the drain that interacting with others places on cognitive resources.

Limitations of the Present Study and Directions for Future Research

There are some limitations of this research that should be kept in mind while evaluating the findings. First, it is unclear as to how closely the digit rehearsal task mimics attention to multiple stimuli in a naturalistic setting. There are many cases in which digit rehearsal may be either more or less cognitively demanding than situations encountered in everyday life. Therefore, the results presented in this article may not generalize to situations either more or less cognitively taxing than the manipulation employed here.

Second, the dependent variable was a measure of overall evaluation, was designed to capture participants’ general feelings of positivity or negativity toward the target. An important direction for future research is whether these results would replicate in any one specific domain such as morality or likeability, or in areas more strongly associated with relationships (e.g., desirability as a friend, date, or spouse). Moreover, although the stereotypes mentioned are plausible reasons for the pattern of evaluative results, the dependent measures were not designed to capture those stereotypes specifically. Future research designed with the intention of eliciting specific stereotypes could prove to be valuable in uncovering some of the mechanisms that generate the double standard.

Third, the sample size was small compared to many double standard studies. With only 6 participants per cell, it is possible that one single outlier was responsible for the large differences in the 19 partner condition. However, two observations should help assuage this concern: The within-cell variances of the 19 partner conditions are similar to or smaller than those of other conditions, and a similar pattern of results appears if one looks at the medians for each cell. Another caveat of the small size is that some of the participant gender differences reported may be unreliable, and as such should be taken as tentative.

Fourth, it is possible the driving mechanism behind these findings is not the application of stereotypes under load but the reduction of egalitarianism. In other words, adding a cognitive load may undermine efforts to maintain one’s monitoring of gender fairness. Although this study sought to reduce demand characteristics by employing a between-subjects design (i.e., eliminate fairness monitoring altogether), it still does not rule out the possibility that the load paradigm reduced fairness monitoring. The two aforementioned possibilities can be teased apart with greater confidence by conducting a variation on this study using a within-subjects design. If results similar to those of this study are obtained using a between-subjects design (where fairness monitoring is quite likely to be operating), then quite a bit of
weight can be given to the gender fairness monitoring explanation.

Finally, this study only examines evaluations of targets with varying numbers of sexual partners. There are many different contexts in which sexual activity occurs, ranging from one-night stands to committed relationships to marriage. It is possible that evaluations of sexually active men and women made under conditions of divided attention may be sensitive to the context in which sexual activity occurs. One hypothesis that should be tested in the future is that being under conditions of divided attention may override the context in which sexual activity takes place. In other words, it may be the case that individuals under a cognitive load may ignore context effects and base their evaluations solely on the amount of sexual activity the target has had. Nonetheless, despite these limitations, these results take an important first step in revealing one of the processes by which the double standard emerges.

In conclusion, a social-cognitive approach to the sexual double standard has thus far shown to be extremely valuable to our understanding attitudes toward sexually active men and women. By taking into consideration the ways in which the social mind operates, great strides should continue to be made in illuminating this previously elusive phenomenon.

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REFERENCES


**APPENDIX A**

Gender: [male/female]

Age: 19

1. Please describe some of your hobbies.
   
   I enjoy watching movies. I go to the theater a couple times a week, and also rent lots of videos and DVDs. I also like to ski. I don’t get to go very often because it’s hard to find free weekends anymore, but I take every chance I get to go skiing.

2. What is something someone may not know about you?
   
   I’ve had sex with [1/7/19 guy(s)/girl(s)]. I don’t have much to say about it. It’s just kind of the way I’ve lived my life. I don’t talk about it much with others, so most people are not aware of this.

3. Describe some of your fears.
   
   Well, as far as tangible things, I’m scared of snakes and reptiles like snakes. As far as intangible things, I fear failing at my goals and not being a success. The thought of not being able to do the things I want scares me.

4. Tell us about your career aspirations.
   
   I would like to become a writer someday. I feel I have pretty good ideas, and I have a talent for putting those ideas on paper. I’m not sure if I’d like to be a journalist or a freelance writer, but I know I want to cover current events and how they affect things.

5. How do you see yourself?
   
   I see myself as a theorist more than a sensor. I internalize a lot of things, and thing abstractly about them. I don’t have to try and think abstractly about things, it just happens. That’s about all.

**APPENDIX B**

1. This person does well in school.
2. This person isn’t very smart. (r)
3. This person will make a lot of money.
4. This person is a failure.
5. This person makes wise decisions
6. This person is successful.
7. This person would do anything for money. (r)
8. This person uses people to get things. (r)
9. If this person was in my house, I’d keep a close eye on him or her. (r)
10. This person will have a good job.
11. This person often takes control of situations.
12. This person is more of a follower than a leader. (r)
13. This person is dominant.
14. This person makes his/her presence felt when entering a room.
15. This person is assertive.

*Note.* (r) denotes reverse scored item.